The Chinese in Papua New Guinea by Nelson, Hank
The chinese in papua new guinea
hank nelsoninTroducTion
Recently there have been articles in the 
press in Australia and Papua New Guinea, a 
Radio National Program and a seminar at The 
Australian National University on the Chinese 
in Papua New Guinea and, more broadly, in 
the Pacific islands. All recognise the increasing 
importance of the Chinese in the region – 
in numbers, wealth and political power.1 In 
Papua New Guinea where the Chinese now 
outnumber Australians by more than two to 
one, their presence has particular significance 
and complexity. Papua New Guinea is clearly 
different from the other Pacific island states 
in its size, resources and porous borders. If 
the Chinese economy is to maintain its rapid 
expansion, then China has to secure sources 
of energy and raw materials. That rational 
and legitimate policy may be expected to be 
followed – as it has in Africa – with China 
increasing aid to the point where it exceeds 
that of many traditional donors and is directed 
at projects and provided on conditions different 
from those determined by other major donors. 
The complexity of the Chinese presence is 
apparent in any attempt to enumerate the 
Chinese population in Papua New Guinea: 
many, arriving independently or as employees 
of large firms, have entered illegally and do 
not appear in official statistics; others have 
entered legally but changed employment 
and overstayed and so are misrepresented in 
the statistics; and many are not Chinese by 
nationality as they have come from Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore or the Philippines and 
correctly do not appear as ‘Chinese’ when 
immigrants are listed by nationality or place of 
origin. The statistical obscurity of the Chinese 
in Papua New Guinea has made it easier for 
other nations to ignore or be unaware of the 
implications of varied and expanding Chinese 
engagement.
new guinea: Taim bipo
A few Chinese traders entered New Guinea 
as the east of the island was being claimed by 
colonial powers; notably Ah Tam (also known 
as Lee Tam Tuck), a Rabaul ship builder and 
merchant who may have arrived before 1884. 
The first large group of Chinese came in 
1889 as indentured labourers for the Germans. 
Wanting men experienced in plantation work, 
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the Germans had contracted them in Singapore 
and the Dutch East Indies. Indentured labourers 
direct from China were recruited in 1898. 
Work on the plantations was hard, pay low and 
the death rate high. Nearly all the indentured 
workers were repatriated at the end of their 
contracts. Most long-term Chinese residents 
came from men who paid their own fares, 
or arranged loans to have them paid, and 
took up employment as carpenters, cooks, 
plantation overseers and merchants. By 1913 
there were just over 1000 Chinese in German 
New Guinea; Chinatown in Rabaul was, by 
then, an established centre. Like pioneering 
migrants elsewhere, many of the early Chinese 
thought of themselves as being in New Guinea 
only briefly while they made money to take 
home; and in the Chinese population men 
outnumbered women by more than ten to one.2
The Australians occupied German New 
Guinea in 1914 and acquired New Guinea 
as a Mandated Territory in 1921. When the 
Australians surveyed the foreign population 
of their new territory in 1921 they found there 
were 1,195 Chinese men and 229 Chinese 
women. Nearly all were Cantonese speakers 
from See Yap. They were engaged primarily 
in commerce, but with significant numbers 
working as artisans and in primary industry. The 
Australians immediately applied the Australian 
Immigration Act which limited further Chinese 
immigration, forcing those given temporary 
entry to gain exemption from the dictation test, 
and imposing other restrictions. Chinese men 
with wives and children in China could not 
bring their families to New Guinea, Chinese 
men whose wives died could not bring another 
woman to New Guinea to look after their 
children, and the Chinese faced restrictions on 
buying land and obtaining licences to operate 
businesses. The restrictions on the immigration 
of Chinese women made it more likely that 
Chinese men would marry mixed race or New 
Guinean women, but most of the children from 
such marriages were brought up within the 
Chinese community. 
By the end of the 1930s, many Rabaul 
Chinese families had converted to Christianity, 
or at least identified with the Methodist or 
Catholic missions and sent their children to 
mission schools. The wealthiest of the Chinese 
were sending sons overseas for education, 
some to Australia and some back to Hong 
Kong or China. In 1941 Bernard Chan came 
back to Rabaul, having been to Wesley College 
and then doing law at Sydney University. He 
was better educated in Australia than nearly all 
Australians in New Guinea, and it was obvious 
he would not be contained within the three 
tier hierarchy of races – Europeans, Asians 
and Melanesians - that were then recognised 
in written and unwritten law in Rabaul. But 
war swept aside the old order and it was only 
partially rebuilt in the postwar.
With Japan at war in China from 1937, the 
Chinese in New Guinea were well aware of the 
threat from Japan. Official visitors from China 
spoke at the Kuo Ming Tang Club in Rabaul 
and many New Guinea Chinese had family at 
risk in China. The Chinese in Rabaul offered to 
form a unit to fight alongside the Australians 
in the event of a Japanese attack, and initially 
the Australians agreed that they could form an 
ambulance unit of about thirty members. The 
Chinese provided uniforms and equipment 
for their young men; but the Australians were 
cautious about non-Australian citizens joining 
the defence force and Australian regulations 
required recruits to be ‘substantially of 
European origin or descent’. The Australians 
decided that they would rather have the help 
of the Chinese as Red Cross volunteers. The 
few survivors of the Chinese who turned up for 
duty in the confusion of the Japanese assault 
on Rabaul on 23 January 1942 were admitted 
to the RSL some forty years later. 
In late December 1941, the Australians 
evacuated white women and children and 
rejected the pleas of the Chinese to allow 
At the 1966 census – the first comprehensive census of the two Australian Territories of Papua and 
New Guinea – sixty-four men and seventeen women (eighty-one) in Papua and 297 men and 188 
women (485) in New Guinea were born in China (totally 566). When asked their nationality 206 men 
and seventy-six women (282) in the two Territories said they were Chinese. When asked their ‘race’ 
1,391 men and 1064 women (2455) said they were Chinese. Of these, 273 were living in Papua. Being 
Chinese was by then about physical and cultural identity. For most, it was unrelated to nationality or 
place of birth.
Box 1: 1966 Census Results
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people were to join one or the other and 
Asians with necessary residential qualifications 
could apply for Australian citizenship. As most 
Chinese then living in New Guinea were born 
there, many were able to apply. A few Chinese 
shifted to Australia, and more moved into the 
neighbouring Territory of Papua and changed 
merchandising in Port Moresby. Prewar, there 
had been almost no Asians in Papua: the 88 
Filipinos being the dominant group. There were 
just five Chinese recorded in the 1933 census of 
Papua.5 In Port Moresby, Luk Poi Wai (known 
affectionately to the Australians as ‘Luke Warm 
Pie’) ran a tailor’s shop above Koki: his was 
then the only Chinese family in Port.
The decision to allow the New Guinea 
Chinese to take Australian citizenship was 
an early and significant change in the White 
Australia policy. The turmoil in postwar China 
and then the victory of the Communists had 
effectively prevented the New Guinea Chinese 
from visiting the mainland and this had 
increased the community’s tendency to look 
south. By the 1970s and 1980s young Chinese 
were losing their fluency in Cantonese.
By independence, many of the Chinese in 
Papua New Guinea had Australian citizenship, 
investments in Australia and had educated their 
children in Australia. In Papua New Guinea 
they were still often socially separate from 
Australians, lived unostentatiously and kept 
clear of politics, although both Julius Chan and 
Perry Kwan (who had a Chinese father and 
Filipino mother) were elected to the House of 
Assembly in 1972, and Robert Seeto served a 
MBE and the King’s Medal for his services. 
Although more than thirty-five Chinese were 
killed by the Japanese and another seven died 
as a result of Allied bombing, most survived 
the war, in spite of suffering deprivation and 
having all capital assets destroyed.3
posTwar
The war damage compensation scheme 
introduced by the Australian government 
was indifferent to agency or race: it paid 
whether the damage was caused by the Allies 
or the Japanese, and Melanesians, Chinese and 
Europeans could apply for the loss of objects 
large or small, personal injury and the death 
of relatives. The Chinese, already attempting 
to rebuild their businesses, were well-placed 
to invest their compensation payments and to 
cater for the needs of villagers who had their 
own payments to spend. Soon the Chinese were 
expanding their businesses, stocking high cost 
cameras, electronic equipment and clothing, and 
selling to Europeans. This change from running 
small trade stores catering to villagers had 
begun before the war, and it accelerated in the 
late 1950s. While the strict policy against any 
further immigration of Chinese was maintained, 
petty discriminatory laws were repealed, 
and Paul Hasluck, Minister for Territories, 
moved to have the population of Papua and 
New Guinea divided into two: an indigenous 
majority and a foreign minority.4 Mixed-race 
Sir Julius Chan, Prime Minister, 1980-82 and 1994-97, was born 
in 1939 on Tanga Island, off New Ireland, the son of Chin Pak 
from China and Tin Koris of Nokon village south of Namatanai, 
New Ireland. Chin Pak, who had arrived in New Guinea in 1921, 
was a plantation owner and trader. During the war the family 
was confined with other Chinese near Namatanai. After primary 
schooling at Rabaul, Julius went to Marist Brothers, Brisbane, 
and began a degree in Agricultural Science at the University of 
Queensland. Returning to New Guinea after a motor cycle acci-
dent, he worked in the public service, took Australian citizen-
ship, and went into the successful family shipping and trading 
business. He was first elected to parliament in 1968 as member 
for Namatanai: he then claimed to speak and read Cantonese, 
English and Pidgin. After independence he became a citizen of 
Papua New Guinea. He was the founding Minister for Finance 
in the first Somare government. Defeated in the 1997 election, 
Sir Julius stood for the New Ireland provincial seat in 2002 and 
again lost, but his son, Byron Chan, won his old seat of Namata-
nai. Both are candidates in 2007.
Chinese women and children 
to take refuge in Australia. That 
decision was reversed a few 
months later when Chinese from 
Wau were flown to Australia, 
and eventually over 300 Chinese 
were evacuated to Australia; 
but the decision to refuse the 
majority of the Chinese women 
to leave was resented. In spite of 
this, several Chinese took great 
personal risks to help Allied 
airmen and coastwatchers and 
provide information about the 
Japanese. Chin Hoi Meen, 
who had worked for the 
administration before the war 
and was a successful merchant 
after it, was presented with an 
Box 2: Sir Julius Chan
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long time as premier of New Irealand Province. 
There were minor incidents in which Papua 
New Guineans expressed resentment against 
Chinese storekeepers and on the eve of self-
government there was increased movement 
of Chinese to Australia but little overt racial 
antagonism. Where there has been looting of 
Chinese stores  - as there was in 1997 as the 
Sandline incident spilled from Murray Barracks 
into nearby shopping centres and when clan 
conflict has led to wider lawlessness in some 
Highlands towns – the attacks have been 
opportunistic and the initial cause had not been 
resentment of the Chinese. In her survey of the 
impact of Papua New Guinea-born Chinese on 
the 1987 elections, Margaret Willson wrote that 
their ‘direct effect on the 1987 elections was 
probably negligible’: they ‘prefer to remain 
unobtrusive both politically and socially’.6 It 
was a reasonable conclusion.
By the 1980s the foreign population of 
Papua New Guinea was undergoing significant 
change. In 1971 the foreign population had been 
over 50,000, and of these the most numerous 
group by nationality were Australians. Around 
3,500 were Asians, and nearly all (about 3,000) 
were Chinese by ethnicity but not by place 
of birth or nationality. The total number of 
citizens were Australians. In fact, in 1980 there 
were more Australians and New Zealanders in 
Papua New Guinea than the total of foreigners 
recorded in 2000. In the Papua New Guinea 
2000 Census National Report it is claimed 
that between the 1990 and 2000 censuses the 
‘numbers of migrants from Australia and Europe 
halved’.7 In 2000 19 percent of all non-citizens 
were born in Australia. In round figures, the 
number of Australians have fallen from more 
that 20,000 on the eve of self-government to 
less than 5,000 thirty years later.
Some time in the 1980s, the numbers 
of Australians in Papua New Guinea were 
surpassed by Asians. But initially, those figures 
were misleading as the 1990 census (and the 
subsequent count) said ‘Indonesians’ were the 
largest group of non-citizens, but most of them 
were living in the Western Province and were 
refugees from Irian Jaya (Papua). The greatest 
number crossed the border in 1984 when over 
10,000 sought refuge east of the Fly River. 
Many are still in Western Province.8 But even 
excluding the border-crossers, Asians now 
outnumber Australians among non-citizens. 
The most numerous of the foreigners in the 
2000 census by place of birth were: Indonesians 
23 percent, Australian 19 percent, Malaysian 
13 percent.
In the census figures the Chinese appear 
to be missing. One explanation is that the old 
Chinese, the descendants of those migrants who 
were living in Mandated German New Guinea, 
have left Papua New Guinea or they were 
born in Papua New Guinea and/or they have 
Australian or Papua New Guinean citizenship 
and so they do not show in the statistics as 
1971: 50,500
1980: 32,670
1990: 25,620
2000: 19,235
Box 3: Non-Citizens in Papua 
New Guinea
Graph 1: Non-Citizens Born Overseas by Country of Birth, 1990 & 
2000 Census
foreigners in Papua New Guinea 
declined from self-government 
and independence as Papua 
New Guineans took their places 
in the work force and foreigners, 
uncertain of their future, chose 
to leave. According to the 
official censuses, non-citizens 
have continued to leave. At the 
same time, the composition of 
the non-citizen population has 
been changing. It is now more 
male, includes fewer children, 
and is therefore probably more 
transient. But most marked has 
been the change in nationality. 
In 1980 over half of the non-
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Chinese – or, in some cases, as either migrants 
or non-citizens. But in any case they are now 
few in number. Most have become part of two-
step migration: having shed part of a culture, 
picked up part of another and added new genes 
in Papua New Guinea they have moved to 
Australia.
The new chinese – from 
souTheasT asia
The old Chinese have been overtaken 
by three other groups. The first are Chinese 
from Southeast Asia. They have come from 
Indonesia and Singapore, but predominantly 
from Malaysia. Publicly, they have been most 
associated with the Rimbunan Hijau (PNG) 
Group.9 Beginning operations in Sarawak as a 
timber company in 1975, Rimbunan Hijau is 
now said to generate over a billion dollars US 
annually through its involvement in resource 
exploitation and other businesses in Southeast 
Asia, Africa, Oceania, Russia and China. From 
its initial involvement in logging in Papua New 
Guinea in 1989, Rimbunan Hijau has built 
a substantial headquarters and broadened its 
operations, most obviously with the publishing 
of the daily newspaper, the National, from 
1993. In the range and extent of its investments 
in logging permits, saw mills, a veneer mill, 
oil palm, trading, travel, shipping, retailing, 
superannuation and property development and 
in the number of Papua New Guineans employed 
(over 4000), Rimbunan Hijau is a significant 
force in the economy.10 But where it has 
been different from most other companies has 
been in its direct engagement with politicians 
and its aggressive public relations. Its public 
promotion and profile is in direct contrast to 
that of the old Chinese companies.
Tan Sri Datuk Tiong Hiew King, the founder 
of the Rimbunan Hijau Group, has played 
a key role in Sarawak politics and served 
as a Malaysian senator. Some commentators 
have seen him coming out of a system in 
which businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians 
combine to pursue an agreed common good; but 
critics have seen a system corrupted so that all 
arms of the law-making, -administering and -
enforcing institutions serve the interests of elite 
businessmen.11 In Papua New Guinea there have 
been many claims of corruption, and they range 
from involving senior politicians (the Prime 
Minister and the Minister for Forests have had 
interests in logging concessions worked by 
Rimbunan Hijau) and accusations of corrupting 
senior officials to secure logging licences to 
providing prostitutes for workers and diverting 
police to intimidate landowners. The harshness 
of the criticism is apparent in the headings and 
catch phrases: ‘corporate criminals’, ‘global 
bully on the loose’, ‘profiting from plunder’, 
‘the rape of PNG’. The Group has publicly and 
vigorously defended itself. As much hostile 
opposition has come from Greenpeace and other 
environmental groups, Rimbunan Hijau has 
blunted criticism by pointing out that much of 
it has come from the ideologically committed, 
and directing attention to particular factual 
errors. The Group has also listed extensive 
public benefits: investments in infrastructure, 
‘Dr Jumogot …told the House that the 
logging company [Rimbunan Hijau] had 
made K500 million since 1996 … but 
local communities were yet to see the 
infrastructure …
The program to carry out reforestation 
has yet to be honoured … the Nraukei 
Township [on Manus], the west coast 
airstrip, schools, aid-posts, roads, and 
other infrastructure have not been built 
as promised.’   Post-Courier, 28 Febru-
ary 2007.
Above: Greenpeace activists attempt to deliver the Golden 
Chainsaw award for deforestation to security guards from Rim-
bunan Hijau.  Photo: Greenpeace.
Box 4: Rimbunan Hijau in the Media
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aid posts, airstrips, schools and even Christian 
churches:
At the opening of the new SDA church 
in the Edevu Elogogo area where 
Rimbunan Hijau has a sawmill, a 
local councillor said: “Apart from the 
church, the company has also assisted in 
building our school, a bridge, 24 hours 
free electricity and a road further inland 
towards Mount Koiari.”12
To manage its companies, and provide 
special skills and the sweat of the unskilled, 
Rimbunan Hijau and other companies have 
brought in many foreign workers. Just how 
many is uncertain, and some may be in Papua 
New Guinea briefly while a particular logging 
operation is underway. Some estimates of 
people brought into the country at any one 
time by Malaysian Chinese have been as high 
as 5000. Sometimes associated with them 
are Chinese from Indonesia, and when their 
workers are included then that may add another 
1000 to the Malaysian Chinese.
The new chinese – from The 
people’s republic of china
A second group of Chinese are those 
coming from the People’s Republic of China 
in accord with Chinese government policy.13 
Since agreement was reached two years ago 
with the Chinese company Metallurgical Group 
Corp (abbreviated for unknown reasons to 
MCC) to develop the Ramu nickel/cobalt mine 
that movement has increased and been under 
greater scrutiny. MCC, one of the biggest 
construction companies in the world, is state 
owned and China will take the entire output of 
the Ramu mine. The biggest project undertaken 
by the Chinese anywhere in the Australia-
islands region, the open-cut mine will require 
extensive infrastructure, including a long 
slurry-carrying pipeline and the development 
of a port on the Madang coast. ENFI, the 
subsidiary of MCC that has started preliminary 
work, has brought in workers, some of whom 
are said to be unskilled and low paid by Papua 
New Guinean standards.
Apart from the imported workers, the 
development of the mine has raised a number 
of issues. The Chinese government has been 
willing to provide funds for infrastructure 
which will be required by the mine, and as 
MCC is government owned that has made 
it difficult to distinguish between aid and 
a commercial venture which might wish to 
offset infrastructure development against tax 
concessions. This has particular relevance as 
MCC appears to have negotiated a generous 
ten year tax holiday. Perhaps inevitably, some 
landowners are dissatisfied, either because 
they are not included in the 2.5 percent stake 
allocated to them or they believe that that 
is not high enough. Again, inevitably, there 
‘How can we allow such a company [MCC] 
to enter our country, rip off our resources and 
treat us like pigs. This is totally inhuman. This 
is another classic ‘under the table’ deal without 
proper documents, procedures and contract 
agreement to govern the mining company …. 
I recommend a termination and deportation of 
these people and their company. Disgusted, 
Waigani.’   Post-Courier, 7 February 2007.
‘Mr Tibu [Department of Labour] said that the 
mine management had been asked to construct 
better messing and kitchen facilities, housing for 
workers, who are currently living in makeshift 
tents, improve workers’ diet and move away 
from segregated accommodation for Chinese 
Above: Chinese Ambassador to PNG, Wei Ruxing, Prime 
Minister Sir Michael Somare and MCC Chairman, Yang 
Changeng toast the Ramu mine.  Photo: The National
and national employees, ‘which suggested discrimination’ in the treatment of workers. The Labour 
Department wants the project management to meet the International Labour Organisation’s standards 
like proper enclosed toilets as currently both male and female employees use an open pit latrine with 
logs placed across an open pit with no privacy.’   National, 8 February 2007.
Box 5: MCC in the Media
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are questions about the environmental impact 
of the mine, particularly about the discharge 
of tailings into the sea near Madang.14 And 
there have been angry complaints from Papua 
New Guinea workers at the construction sites 
because of the poor housing, pay rates below 
the legal minimum, crude toilets and separate 
compounds for Papua New Guinean and 
Chinese workers.15
Revelations about the conditions at work 
sites after a visit by Labour Secretary, David 
Tibu, brought an angry public response. There 
have also been guarded suggestions that some 
officials or politicians have been rewarded 
for decisions favouring the mining company. 
Peter Ipatas, Governor of Enga and leader of 
the People’s Party, claimed that his demand for 
a renegotiation of the Ramu mine agreement 
was part of the fight against corruption.16 
He also suggested that the bringing in of 
Chinese workers may have violated Papua New 
Guinea’s laws.
The allegations of corruption were given 
increased substance when the Ombudsman, 
Peter Masi, said he was investigating reports 
that Madang leaders had been awarded 
contracts ‘relating to the mine … and in breach 
of the Leadership Code’ and that the National 
Housing Corporation had been pressured to sell 
properties to developers.17
The new chinese – The 
unsancTioned
A third group of Chinese entering Papua 
New Guinea has also been leaving mainland 
China. From evidence leading to convictions 
in Papua New Guinean courts or from Labour 
Department enquiries, many hold forged work 
permits, or have obtained visas by unknown 
means from the Papua New Guinea embassy 
in Beijing, or obtained visas for one reason but 
switched to other activities and overstayed.18 
Some have been engaged in illegal or marginally 
illegal businesses such as gambling, selling 
cheap products carrying prestige brands or – in 
one report – selling fake toothpaste.19 From 
observing who runs stores and food stalls 
and from newspaper reports, these Chinese 
migrants are numerous and while most are 
in the main towns, they are working widely 
throughout the country - from the islands to the 
Highlands. Most are probably battling to make 
The recent migrants from China have 
provoked resentment. It is expressed in 
newspaper articles as well as letters to the 
editor:
The influx of Asian businesses and 
their cheap products can wipe out the 
small economy of East New Britain. 
Government agencies revealed the new 
Asian businesses sell cheap products at 
mark-up prices and do not re-invest their 
money in the province. Instead, they 
send all their money out of the country 
through a particular commercial bank 
where they do not pay any fees or taxes. 
The agencies also revealed many of these 
new Asian businesses do not comply with 
PNG’s tax laws – leaving the province 
deprived of the much-needed goods and 
services tax (GST)….
In Kokopo at least eight new shops, 
all owned by the same group, have 
sprung up around the town in less than 
two years. The agencies said that these 
Asians were all from the same area in 
China and came in as one group before 
they mushroomed throughout the town 
with different shops.20
Papua New Guineans point to the tight security 
in the stores and say that if there are local people 
on cash registers they are closely monitored. 
One letter writer spoke nostalgically of ‘our old 
their way and exploiting whatever opportunities 
they can, and while they may cut a few corners 
they are not ‘criminals’; but a few seem to be 
tough, gun-carrying and presumably connected 
to gangs or organised crime.
‘The Kavieng District Court on Monday sen-
tenced seven Chinese nationals to six months 
imprisonment with hard labour for living and 
working in Kavieng, New Ireland province with-
out proper work permit…. The court heard the 
first three initially had contracts to buy rubber 
and do timber processing but went ahead into 
fisheries by buying beche-de-mer, seahorses 
and seagulls. Four others came to PNG under 
permits to work for a logging company in Lae. 
But instead, were found carrying out other busi-
ness activities such as buying vanilla beans for 
as low as 20 toea per kilo …’ .   National, 21 
February 2007.
Box 6: Illegal Practices
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Estimates – some impressionistic guesses - 
of the numbers of these recent Chinese migrants 
engaged in small businesses agree that they can 
be measured in thousands, probably over 5000. 
Adding a few Chinese from Singapore and 
including those who have come with resource 
companies, then that suggests a Chinese 
population of over 10,000.23 The Chinese are 
by far the most numerous of all foreigners 
in Papua New Guinea. And they are almost 
invisible in the 2000 census.
There are few migrants from Taiwan in 
Papua New Guinea, and tension between 
Taiwan (Republic of China) and the People’s 
Republic of China is less marked in Papua New 
Guinea than in some other Pacific islands, such 
as Solomon Islands, where governments have 
recognised Taiwan and Taiwan provides support 
for particular politicians to ensure continued 
commitment. (The most Taiwanese were in 
New Guinea between 1942 and 1945. They 
were then Formosans, residents of a Japanese 
colony and conscripted into the Japanese army, 
often in non-combatant auxiliary and labour 
units.) But the division between the two Chinas 
still impinges on Papua New Guinean politics. 
It did so dramatically but without consequence 
in 1999 during the last days of Bill Skate’s 
prime ministership when he made a secret 
trip to Taiwan to secure funds for his failing 
administration (and allegedly for himself) in 
exchange for abandoning Papua New Guinea’s 
One China policy and recognising Taiwan. 
But soon after his return he was defeated on 
a vote of no confidence in the parliament and 
replaced as Prime Minister by Mekere Morauta. 
More recently, the Chinese embassy in Papua 
New Guinea has ‘strongly protested’ against 
Taiwanese participation in the Pacific Islands 
News Association (PINA).24 PINA was to hold 
a conference in Solomon Islands in May 2007, 
and the Solomons Islands Media Association 
has accepted a donation from Taiwan of 
US$65,000. In return – or coincidentally – the 
Taiwanese were being allowed to send a large 
delegation to the conference. The Chinese 
made it clear to the Papua New Guinea Media 
Council, the largest contributor to PINA, that it 
did not want the Taiwanese getting seats among 
the Islands media. The Chinese thought that if 
the Papua New Guinea government supported 
the One China policy then its media should 
do the same. That was scarcely a declaration 
of support for an independent press, but it did 
illustrate the sensitivities of the Chinese to any 
issues involving Taiwan.
conclusion
There is almost no similarity to, or 
continuity with, the Chinese in Papua New 
Guinea now and the Chinese of the 1930s 
who, even if born in New Guinea, held a 
certificate of registration of an alien on which 
the bearer was identified by his thumb print. 
The Chinese were then a minority, largely 
unprotected by a home government, subject 
to petty discrimination, deliberately avoiding 
party politics and only entering the public arena 
to make a general show of being loyal citizens 
in such events as the Rabaul Empire Day 
parade. The Chinese in Papua New Guinea now 
outnumber Australians by two to one; some are 
backed by a powerful government in China 
which is extending its global political and 
economic reach, and some have connections to 
other governments in Southeast Asia; they are 
engaged in billion dollar resource projects; they 
have joined vigorously in public debate, hiring 
time Chinese friends’ and contrasted them with 
the ‘discriminatory’ new merchants.21
The apparent ease with which visas have 
been obtained at the Papua New Guinea embassy 
in Beijing has been said to be one reason why 
ambassador Max Rai is being replaced by John 
Momis. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Paul Tiensten, acknowledged the need 
to halt the flow of illegal immigrants which 
was giving the ‘department a bad name’.22
‘Kainantu town in Eastern Highlands province 
was in chaos last Friday when a mob raided 
an Asian shop and looted all its merchandise 
in broad daylight. Stones and other missiles 
were hurled at police and vehicles owned by 
Asians.’   National, 16 October 06.
‘Papua New Guineans cannot and will not 
tolerate two things. Firstly, the cheap tactics 
employed by foreign companies who come in 
to help develop the natural resources of this 
country, and, secondly, fellow Papua New 
Guineans who sell this country to the dogs.’ 
Hila and Kila Willie, Post-Courier, 23 February 
2007.
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high competence in public relations, and one of 
the major resource firms owns a national daily 
newspaper which is partisan when the interests 
of any activities of the parent company are an 
issue; and they have become involved in public 
decision-making from the highest to the lowest 
levels.25 Some influence on decision-making 
is the appropriate lobbying of those with a 
case to argue; some of the payments made 
to political parties are within the range that 
individuals and companies normally contribute 
in democratic systems; but just from what 
is on the public record in the courts and the 
ombudsman’s reports a few Chinese change 
or subvert government decisions by corrupting 
elected and appointed officials. The very 
presence of so many illegal migrants working 
in jobs where they do not have the appropriate 
licence is indicative of widespread low-level 
violation of government regulation. From the 
evidence presented in 1987 and 1989 to the 
T. E. Barnett enquiry into corruption in the 
forestry industry, and from latter reports and 
practices in other countries, the timber industry 
has long been rife with malpractice. It must 
seem ironical to the original companies that 
developed the Panguna and Ok Tedi mines 
that the Ramu nickel and cobalt mine appears 
to have violated the established standards for 
international companies: providing fair wages 
and conditions for local workers, employing 
and training a maximum number of local 
workers, not importing unskilled workers, 
paying a reasonable return to local governments, 
ensuring just compensation for landowners, 
and conducting pre-production environmental 
impact studies.
Outside commentators have to be careful not 
to accuse the Chinese of illegal or undesirable 
actions as though they are the only national 
group involved. The Chinese stand out because 
they are new, numerous and involved in the 
largest and most public ventures, not because 
they are the most venal. Commentators also 
have to accept the obvious: the Chinese have 
every right to pursue national, company and 
personal goals in Papua New Guinea. Scrutiny 
of legality, morality and mutual benefit to 
Papua New Guineans must be applied equally 
to all foreigners.
Four final observations. First, states, such as 
Papua New Guinea, where the bureaucracy has 
difficulty enforcing policy and where officials 
and politicians from Waigani to local level 
governments are vulnerable to large and small 
inducements, have great difficulty getting a fair 
return on their resources or even controlling the 
composition of their own population; and once 
bribes have been paid the erosion of institutional 
strength and civil trust is rapid. Secondly, 
China will continue to play an increasingly 
important role in the region. The issue is 
not whether it exercises greater influence but 
how and in what direction. Thirdly, Australia 
continues to speak – and issue reports – as 
though it is not just the dominant player in the 
region but virtually the only big player, that this 
is where the rest of the world expects Australia 
to have expertise, and where Australia provides 
most aid, guides development and intervenes 
at times of natural and man-made disasters. 
When Papua New Guineans suggest that they 
do not want to be beholden to Australians and 
that there are alternatives, this is scarcely taken 
seriously in Australia. It should be, and in 
future it will have to be. Failure to recognize 
growing Chinese engagement in Papua New 
Guinea was apparent in recent statements by 
the Australian government and opposition. The 
Defence Update of 2007 in its review of 
Australia’s strategic environment drew attention 
to China as a ‘driver of economic activity both 
regionally and globally’, the importance of 
United States-Japan-China relationships, the 
vulnerability of the Papua New Guinea state 
suffering from problems of governance, law 
and order, weak job creation and poor delivery 
of health and education services. But it did 
not consider the significance of China and its 
growing economic and strategic power as a 
player in Papua New Guinea.26 Speaking at the 
Lowy Institute on 5 July 2007, Kevin Rudd, 
Leader of the Opposition, claimed that the time 
had come ‘for a fundamental rethink of the 
direction of Australia’s development assistance 
strategy’ and he set out a ‘long-term Pacific 
Partnership for Development and Security’. 
The seven-point approach to foster primary 
education, better health care, infrastructure, 
youth unemployment, business development, 
better governance and improved law and order 
was to be negotiated between Australia and 
each island state. The program did not mention 
the role of the Chinese or the need to consider 
or engage any other national or international 
donors.27 Fourthly, Papua New Guineans resent 
what they see as migrants taking jobs and 
business opportunities, buying favours and 
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taking wealth out of the country. It is possible 
that Australia will one day have to intervene 
to protect Chinese migrants whose lives and 
property are under threat. The targeting of 
Chinese – many innocent of involvement in the 
precipitating events – was apparent in the riots 
in Nuku’alofa and Honiara in 2006. Perhaps 
Australia will fly any endangered Chinese to 
Manus or Nauru: that would indeed be a Pacific 
solution.
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